- Blake, William D. and Sanford V. Levinson. 2016. The Limits of Veneration: Public Support for a New Constitutional Convention. Constitutional Studies 2(1): 1-22.
- Levinson, Sanford V. and William D. Blake. 2016. “When Americans Think about Constitutional Reform: Some Data and Reflections.” Ohio State Law Journal 77(3): 211-36.
- Blake, William D., Hans J. Hacker and Shon R. Hopwood. 2015. “Seasonal Affective Disorder: Clerk Training and the Success of Supreme Court Certiorari Petitions.” Law and Society Review 49(4): 973-97.
- Blake, William D. 2015. “Pine Tar and the Infield Fly Rule: An Umpire’s Perspective on the Hart-Dworkin Jurisprudential Debate.” In Cooperstown Symposium on Baseball and American Culture: 2013-2014, ed. William J. Simons. Jefferson City, NC: McFarland.
- Blake, William D. and Amanda J. Friesen. 2013. “The Politics of Denying Communion to Catholic Elected Officials.” The Forum: A Journal of Applied Research in Contemporary Politics 11(4): 671-84.
- Blake, William D. 2013. “Pyrrhic Victories: How the Secularization Doctrine Undermines the Sanctity of Religion.” Journal of Church and State 55(1): 1-22.
- Blake, William. 2012. “God Save This Honorable Court: Religion as a Source of Judicial Policy Preferences.” Political Research Quarterly 65(4): 814-26.
- Blake, William. 2012. “Umpires as Legal Realists”. PS: Political Science and Politics 45(2): 271-76.
- Blake, William D. and Hans J. Hacker. 2010. “The Brooding Spirit of the Law: Supreme Court Justices Reading Dissents from the Bench.” Justice System Journal 31(1): 1-25. Project Data.
- Hacker, Hans J. and William D. Blake. 2005. “The Neutrality Principle: The Hidden Yet Powerful Legal Axiom at Work in Brown v. Board of Education.” Berkeley Journal of African-American Law and Policy 8(1): 5-59.
- Blake, William. 2005. “Jurisprudence Transcending Time and Space: Affirmative Action and the Revolution of 1937.” Dartmouth Law Journal 2(2): 19-28.
- Blake, William. 2003. “The Filibuster, the Constitution, and the Founding Fathers.” Parliamentary Journal 44(2): 43-53.
Dissertation: Judicial Independence in the American States
The special role courts play in a democracy requires designers of constitutions to consider the delicate trade-offs between judicial independence and democratic accountability. This dissertation analyzes the decisional consequences of state supreme court institutional structures. States utilize several types of election and elite reappointment, and each method carries a systematically different risk of incumbent defeat. My theory predicts that as reappointment uncertainty increases, judicial independence decreases. I define judicial independence as the degree to which judicial decisions are a reflection of how a judges sincerely sees the law. I measure judicial independence by quantifying the external influence of partisan, elite, popular, and economic pressures applied to judges. I consider the normative implications of the empirical findings for American constitutional design by considering a balanced approach between some form of the rule of law, as expressed through judicial independence, and popular constitutionalism, as expressed through democratic accountability.